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ABSTRACT
Despite valid criticisms, many developing countries have issued non-transferable import
licenses to a limited number of final-good producers so as to restrict imports of an input, such as
capital equipment. This paper demonstrates that for a given import quota, such licensing restrictions
can actually increase domestic production of both the input and the final product, but at the cost of
reduced quota rents. Under pure competition, domestic welfare falls relative to the use of marketable
quota licenses, but if foreigners would get the quota rents, or if external economies cause decreasing
costs, then bureaucratic allocation can dominate.
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1, Introduction
Bureaucratic licemtig schemes have frequently been used to restrict
imports of intermediate goods, such as capital equipment and machinery, in
developing countries, most notably India and Brazil, but also in more succ~sful
countries such as Taiwanl. These restrictions have been imposed with the idea
of developing a dommtic manufacturing base in capital goods with appeal
typically being made to the “infant industry argument for protection”. Even if
one accepts the argument for infant industry protection, the development of a
bureaucracy to diratly allocate import licenses seem hard to justify or even
comprehend from a standpoint of promoting economic welfare. Not only is the
policy instrument far from transparent, the need to negotiate what often s~m to
be byzantine bureaucratic rules typically results in significant misallocation and
higher deadweight losses. Other more market based policy instruments, such as
marketable quota licenses or a tariff, are both more transparent and allocate
imports to the high=t value use. Assuming policy makers have a genuine desire
to promote development, is there any offsetting advantage that might help
explain this choice of policy instruments?
This paper examines the implications of bureaucratic import licensing
restrictions by focusing on two commonly observed features of such schemes.
First, import licenses are allocated only to established producers that dirwtly use
‘In the 1950’s and 1960’s in Taiwan, firm spmitic approval was required
to import products placed on the “controlled import items” list to encourage
domestic manufacture (See Wade(1990), pp. 122-126).2
the imported input. The import licenses cannot be sold or transfemed and,
moreover, resale r=trictions apply to the imported goods. This non-
transferability has often been supported by the use of foreign exchange controls
that relatively allocate foreign exchange to individual firms. The swond typical
feature that prova significant is the tendency for bureaucrats to accept only a
proportion of license applications (or of foreign exchange applications), rejating
others, even though the rej mted applications are essentially no different. This
wuld be viewed as inequitable for those firms, the non-license holders, that fail
to r~eive any import quota. However, although domestic welfare is reduced if
domestic production costs remain constant, a licensing scheme incorporating
both featur= has some perhaps surprising implications for the size of the
intermediate-good industry created by import replacement. Specificallyy, for a
given import quota, such a scheme can boost the domestic outputs of both the
intermediate and final products above the levels that would be achievable with
marketable quota licenses or an equally restrictive, equivalent tariff.
To achieve tis increase in output requires that the firm-level quota
allocated to each license holder be raised above the level of the input the firm
would purchase if it had to pay the higher domestic price. This reduces the
marginal valuation of a license to a license holder (the value of being able to
import one more unit) below the marginal valuation of a non-license holder,
given by the excess of the domestic price over the import price of the input.
Thus a “dual-price” market is created in which license holders face a lower
implicit price or marginal cost for own use of the input causing them to use their
Wnder pure competition, use of marketable licenses is equivalent to a tariff
for the same import level.3
quota allocation so as to produce a higher output than do non-license holder<.
By contrast, iflicenses were marketable, orifatariff were used, this equali-
marginal costs across firms, reducing the output of license holders to the same
lower level as non-license holders. Since aggregate imports are unchanged,
domestic production of the input falls together with final-good output.
Since the distortion caused by the import quota reduces final-good
output, raising this output is beneficial. However, output is increased by the use
of non-transferable licenses only by driving a wedge between the valuations of
different groups of users. This amounts to a further distortion, which tends to
lower welfare. Specifically the reduced marginal value of an import license to
license holders arising from an increase in the firm-level quota, directly lowers
the value of quota rents. Since, for a given aggregate level of imports, a higher
firm-level quota raises the proportion of non-license holders with no choice but
to buy domestic, it also raises domwtic production of the input. As a
consequence, licensing schemes associated with larger increases in domestic
output also cause a greater loss in quota rents. Indeed, output is highest under
a “zero-rent” licensing scheme in which license holders are allocated a quota
equal to what they would import under free trade and no quota rents are
generated.
It is comforting for the standard prescription in favor of marketable
licenses that this loss in rents is sufficiently large” that, at least in a small
3A dual-price market could also arise if only exporters can import
intermediate inputs duty free up to some limit and resale is prevented. SW
Rodrik (1994) for examples relating to Taiwan and Korea.
“That quota rents are large is supported by a number of studies (see Feenstra
(1992)) showing that the loss of quota rents is a significant part of the cost of
a VER.4
country, perfatly competitive setting, the use of marketable quota licenses
always dominates bureaucratic allocation when import prices and domestic
production costs remain constant. However, if foreign firms would anyway
extract the quota rents5 as occurs when a VER (voluntary export restraint) is the
alternative, a “zero-rent” licensing scheme bwome-s optimal in a broad class of
~. Viewing this last rtiult in the light of the thwry of domestic distortion&,
it is not so surprising that a seemingly inefficient regulation preventing the
formation of a market in licenses can be beneficial in a third best world in which
there is both an import restriction and a domestic loss of quota rent.
Neverthel=s, since VERS are quite common, this result could have some
empirical relevance.
A further and perhaps more significant result arises when the domestic
costs of intermediate-good production fall with expansion of industry output.
Consideration of decreasing costs is natural in this context, since the existence
of external wonomies arising from hands on learning by doing is typically part
of the infant industry justification for protection’. Given the central result that
non-tradable quota licens= can raise domestic output, one might expect that the
=ond best optimal policy would be to institute a bureaucratic scheme at some
sufficiently large rate of decrease in cost. What is perhaps surprising is that this
r=ult holds for any, even a very small, rate of decrwse in costs. This suggests
~s is more likely if the foreign suppliers are imperfectly competitive.
Imperfwt competition in input supply would not fundamentally change the output
rmlts.
6S= Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1969).
‘Gains in experience by workers and managers are not fully captured by
individual firms since personnel are fr~ to move to other firms or start up new
firms.5
that the efficiency argument in favor of marketable quota licenses has something
of a knife-edge character.
The above discussion indicates that in a second best context there are
legitimate efficiency arguments for the use of bureaucratic licensing schemes and
it is possible that policy makers had these ideas in mind when choosing the
bureaucratic route. However, these arguments abstract from other costs
associated with bureaucratic schemes such as rent-sinkings and the cost of the
bureaucracy itself. Since, in addition, inducd changes in the structure of the
industry, such as merger between license holders and non-license holders, could
undo the output gains in the long run, there is no implied policy conclusion in
favor of bureaucratic schemes.
At a more fundamental level, the paper contributes a new theoretical
argument showing that in a setting where the quantity of an input is restricted,
the use of licensing regulations to create different prices for different groups of
users can at least partly be understood on the basis of output effwts in the
industry. For example, suppose that a limit is set on the total amount of a
polluting chemical, such as refrigerants containing CFC’S, that can be used in
the products of a particular industry. The daire to limit losses in output and
employment might then help explain the use of command and control methods
with different levels of enforcement across firms as opposed to issuing
marketable permits.
Despite widespread use, as shown by the surveys of trade practices in
Trela and Whalley (1991) and Erzan et al (1989), non-transferable quota licens=
have received little attention in the academic literature. Trela and Whalley
‘Spencer (1996) extends the model to consider rent-seeking in the context
of “Law of the Similars” type schemes in which imports are permitted only if
they are sufficiently different from locally produced products.6
(1991) also estimate the costs imposed by non-transferable export quota licenses
in “locking out” newer lower cost producers. In Anderson (1987), the non-
transferability of export quotaa between counties reduces world welfare because
it prevents arbitrage in a situation of demand uncertain y. Finally, Krishna and
Tan (1996) consider the effects of non-transferability of quota licenses when
licenses are sold by the government prior to the revelation of demand
uncertainty. Although non-transferability can increase the market price, welfare
nevertheless falls when equal weights are given to consumer surplus and
revenue. Related work dealing with other trade restrictions applying to
intermediate goods includes Grossman (198 1) and Vousden (19 87), who consider
the output and welfare effects of domestic content prot=tion under pure
competition.
Section 2 of the paper presents the fundamen~l insight as to why non-
transferability of licenses can raise domwtic output. The paper then develops a
model to show the implications of this insight for import licensing restrictions
applied to intermediate goods. Section 3 provides an overview of the model,
Section 4 develops the model and Section 5 explores the central output result.
Swtion 6 then examines welfare effects, with particular attention given to the
roles played by quota rents and by decreasing costs in the domestic intermediate
goods industry. Finally Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2. The Fundamental Idea
To further explain why non-transferable quota licenses can increase
domestic output, suppose that the intermediate good can be imported at a price
# (F for foreign) or produced domestically, but at a strictly higher price rD (D
for domestic). Only a subset of firms (the license holders) receive the non-
transferable licenses restricting imports to the quota Q. As illustrated in Fig. 1,
under a “dual-price” licensing scheme, the firm-level quota, denoted ~ exceeds7
the quantity of the input that the firm would purchase as a non-license holder,
reducing the value, denoted X, of an additional license to a license holder below
the value, y = # - # to a non-license holder. License holders expand output
(shown at point B) above the output y(f) of a non-license holder (shown at
point A).
s




Fig. 1: Intermediate-Good Market
Suppose now that the licenses are made marketable. If the quota Q is
sufficiently restrictive to induce domestic production of the input, a license will
command a price ~ = rD - P. Consequently, the marginal cost P of the input
to (previous) non-license holders is unchanged and hence the output produced
by these firms is also unchanged. Since X rises to equal -y, this gives rise to a
“unified market” in which license holders also face a marginal opportunity cost
(F + X) of production equal to f’. Thus license holders sell licenses so as to
reduce output from ~ to y(fl (see Fig. 1) causing an unambiguous fall in
domestic final-good output. Domestic production of the input also falls since the
purchase of licenses by (previous) non-license holders reduces their demand for
the dom=tically produced input, while @revious) license holders continue to use8
only importsg.
The above argument is very general. It does not depend on particular
demand or market conditions and as previously mentioned, it has implications
for the use of quota-licenses in other areas, such m pollution control. However,
the need to create and maintain dual prices in equilibrium imposes restrictions
on the model. ~us, further modelling is required both to give an understanding
of these restrictions and to explore the welfare implications.
3. Model Overview
A competitive industry consisting of n firms located in the domestic
country (the LDC) produc~ a final good Y, both for export and domestic
consumption. The industry is small in world markets and thus is unable to affwt
the world price p for good Y or the import price rF of an intermediate good X,
10 Three inputs are used to produce good Y: good such as capital equipment .
X, labor L and a spwific factor T, which could represent the limited pool of
managers with the necessary talent to operate a firm in the industry or,
alternatively, some scarce natural resource such as land of a particular type.
Capital equipment X is producd domestically by a competitive industry using
labor alone at an average cost P and, since P > P, it would all be imported
under free tradeii. To close the model, a second (traded) final good Z, also
produced by a competitive industry with labor alone, acts w a numeraire. Since
~ am indebted to a refer~ for sugg=ting Fig. 1 and this was of explaining
the issue.
lolf p = p(y) where p’ < 0, domestic output Y would still incr~se under
“dual-price” schemes, but by a smaller amount. The terms of trade effect from
the fall in p would raise welfare if the good is imported but reduce welfare to
the extent that the good is exported.
llDomestic ad forei~ produc~ units of the input X are homogenmus.9
labor has a constant marginal product in producing Z, the domestic wage,
denoted by w, remains constant.
The fact that only a fixed quantity P of the specific factor is available
in the domestic economy creat~ diminishing returns to labor, making the
aggregate output of good Y determinate, even given the small country
assumption. me analysis is simplified in the main text by assuming that each
final-good producer requires just one (lumpy) unit of the specific factor, which
becomes sunk at the time of entry the industry. This fixes the number n = ~
of domestic final-good producers and also provides a mechanism by which firms
can prove they have a legitimate commitment to the industry so as to qualify to
apply for an import license. Also for simplicity, production of Y requires the
intermediate good X be UA in fixed proportion]z, with the units chosen so that
one unit of X is required for each unit of Y. Hence, assuming that labor exhibits
diminishing marginrd productivity when combined with one unit of T and using
subscripts to repr=ent partial derivatives, the production function is given by
Y = min[X,f(L, 1)] where f= > 0 and fw c O. (3.1)
A more realistic and more general, but also more complicated model
in which firms can be of different si~s determined by the quantity of their
investments in the specific factor, is developed in the Appendix. An ability to
handle different sizes of firms is obviously important when considering real
world licensing schemes and all the results are shown to carry over. A further
contribution is to show the critical importance of the sunk nature of the specific
factor in maintaining the dual-prices necessary for the bureaucratic scheme to
raise output. As the Appendix shows, if the specific factor were not sunk, it
l~f firms wuld substitute away from the input, this would reduce the
magnitude of the increase in output from a dual-price scheme, but not
fundamentally change results.10
would be sold by non-license holders to licence holders to the point that output
is reduced to the same level as under a marketable license scheme. In effwt,
making the spmific factor non-lumpy and fully tradeable has the same
implication for overall output as if the import licenses themselv= were
tradeable. Although the fundamental effect driving these results is not limited to
the particular model developed here, ttis suggests that any long run chang~ that
allow license holders to gain access to the resources of non-license holders
would negate the beneficial output effects.
The bureaucratic licensing scheme implementing the import quota Q for
the intermediate good involves a lottery in which only a proportion s (s for
success) of the identical final-good producers are successful in obtaining import
licensw. Import licenses are allocated fr= of charge to the winners of the
license lottery. So as to rule out rent-seeking, s is assumed constant. Thus firms
have no influence on their individual probabilities of success. Also, resale of the
imported input (or the license itsel~ is prohibited13. This restriction on resale
places a natural limit on the quantity of the input that each license holder would
want to import, but license holdem are also limited by a firm-level quota,
denoted
~ = ~(s,~ E Q/ns, (3.2)
where ~,(s,Q) = - ~/s < 0 and ~~(s,Q) = l/ns > 0. Thus a smaller firm-level
quota is associated with an increase in the proportion s of license holders or a
tightening in the overall quota Q.
If all final-good producers receive import licenses (i.e. ifs = 1), then
the marginal value of a quota license is the same across firms, giving rise to the
13Prohibitive fines could be imposed for non compliance. In the context of
this model, all actions are observable so all violators would be caught.11
same total levels of production as would be achieved if licensfi were
marketable14. This correspondence betw~n the bureaucratic scheme at s = 1
and a marketable license scheme, makes it a convenient base for comparison.
Also, althoughs is treated as a continuous variable, this is not strictly nmessary.
For example, if there were just 4 equal size final-good firms, s could take the
values 1/4, 1/2, 3/4 and 1, which is sufficient variation to show the r~ults.
However, if a firm were able to monopolize the market by cornering the entire
supply of the s~ific factor, then with only one license holder, s ordy takes the
value 1 and the model collapses.
There are thr~ stages of decision for final-good producers. In stage 1,
after the government announces the license allocation process together with the
valu~ ofs and ~, firms decide whether to enter the domestic final-good industry
taking into account the equilibrium outcomes of subsequent stages. To enter each
firm must purchase one unit of the spwific factor which is available at a market
clearing price. In stage 2, producers can choose to apply for import licenses and
license allocation takes place as announced. In stage 3, the intermediate good is
imported and producd domestically, the final good is produced and revenue-s
are distributed.
4. Finn Level Decisions
This section develops the effwts of the bureaucratic licensing schemes
on the decisions of firms as to entry and output. Consideration is first given to
the third stage competitive output equilibrium, before moving back to the limnse
application stage and the decision to enter the market.
The respective outputs of a final-good producer with and without an
l%e licens= could be allocated to firms and then sold or be initially sold
by the government.12
import license are denoted by yi for i = F,D. If ~ is sufficiently large that
license holders use ody imported capital equipment (good X), since one unit of
X is n~d to produce one unit of Y, license holders each import fl units and
non-license holders each purchase yD units of (the identical) but more costly
domestic equipment. Also letting C@) = wLi denote the total cost of the labor
V used at the firm level and u, the price paid for the unit of the specific factor
purchased in stage 1, the profit of a final-good producer using equipment only
from source i for i = F,D is then
7ri = (p-+)yi - C(yi) - a. (4.1)
In stage 3, each non-license holder sets yD to maximize profit R,
taking p and f’ as given. Assuming p > f, the first order condition
aR/ayDs P - f - c’(Y9 s o, (4.2)
defies an internal equilibrium in which yD = y(f) >0. Since a2#/(ay~2 = -
C“@) < 0 because of diminishing marginal productivity (fU < O), the second
order condition is satisfied. To relate the size of the firm-level quota ?(s, Q) to
output y(fl, let s = S denote the value ofs at which
~(S,Q) = y(f). (4.3)
It follows that if the firm-level quota ~(s,Q) were at or below y(f), or
equivalently ifs > S (since y, < 0 from (3.2)), then after filling their quota,
license holders would raise their output to the same level as non-license holders
by purchasing the domestically produced input X at the margin: i.e.
YF = y(f) 2 ~(s,Q) ifs > S. (4.4)
However, if the quota allocation were sufficiently generous to make ~(s,Q) >
y(fl, then taking into account thats < 1, license holders will purchase imports
alone for s < min[~, 1]. It is possible that R > 1. In this case the firm-level
quota ~(1 ,Q) ats = 1 strictly exceeds y(fl so license holders purchase none of
the domestically produced input whatever the value ofs.13
Supposing that s < min [3,1], in stage 3 each license holder sets its
output yp to maximi~ # as in (4.1) subjmt to yF < ~(s, Q). Forming the
Lagrangim ~ - TF + A(~(s,Q) - y~, the Lagrange multiplier A is the value of
relaxing ~ through an additional import license (as introduced in Section 2) or
equivalently the marginal quota rent. Output yF then satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions:
&/dyF = p -(~ + ~) - C’(yq = O (4.5a)
&/dA = ~(s,Q) - yF >0 where (d~/dA)X = O. (4.5b)
btting pF = rF + A, pF repraents each license holder’s marginal opportunity
cost from the use of the intermediate input in production. From (4.5a&b) and
(4.2), yF can be written as Y = yb~ where y(.) is the same function deftig
YD= Y(f)- If ~ > 0, then the firm-level quo~ is binding so Y@F) = 7(s,Q).
If X = O then PF = rF and the license holder producw y(~), its level of output
at free trade.
An important role is played by the “zero-rent” licensing scheme under
which license holders can import as much as they want for own use, generating
no quota rents. Nevertheless, imports are restricted bwause ody a proportion
of final-good producers, denoted by s = S, receive import licenses. At s = S,
the firm-level quota eqmls the quantity of the input the firm would import at
fr= trade: i.e.
;@,Q) = Y(fi ad ~ = 0. (4.6)
For the subsequent analysis, attention is restricted to the region of interest in
which the firm-level quota is binding (i.e. s 2 Q. In this region, using (4.4) and
(4.6), license-holder output can be expressed as
Y(P9 = {
~(s,Q)) > y(r~ for s c ~,min[~,l]] (4.7)
y(r~ > Y(s,Q for s c P,l].14
Similarly, the marginal quota rent X can be expressed as15:
X = A(s,Q) = { f~-_r~,
- C’~(s,Q)) for s ~ ~,min~,l]] (4.8)
for s ~ [S,1].
As can be -n from (4.8) using (3.2), an increase ins aboves raises the value
of A: i.e
——
N = C“(y)y/s >0 for s G ~, min[s, l]]. (4.9)
In demonstrating that the bureaucratic scheme can increase domestic
output, an important step is to show that firma failing to obtain a license will
nevertheless always choose to produce. LettiDg Pn - r“ for notational
convenience, this result follows b=ause the stage 3 variable profit
v@) = @-p’)y@’) - c(y@)), (4.10)
from producing output ybi) for i = D,F is strictly positive’b. With marginal
cost increasing once the specific factor has been committed, even non-license
holders earn rents on infra-marginal units of output. As illustrated in Fig. 2, a
non-license holder would produce output yD at point A, equating price p with
marginal cost based on the price P for the input so as to earn infra-marginal
rents (variable profit) as shown by the hatched area. As for license holders, the
lower price rF paid for imports, shifts down the marginal cost curve. Under a
~ro-rent scheme, license holders are unconstrained by the firm-level quota ~
and hence each produces its free-trade level of output shown at point B.
15Since C’@(S, Q)) = p - P from (4.3) and (4.2), we have A@,Q) = f -
# and using (4.4), this implies ~(s,Q) = F - P for s E [~,1]. me other part
of (4.8) follows from (4.5a) and yF = ~.
Yb9
lfis follows since V@) = @.Pi-c’(y)]dy > 0 from (4.10), c“(y) >
I
O, (4.2) and (4.5a).15
However, a more rtitrictive firm-level quota shown at ~ would constrain the
firm to produce where price exceeds marginal cost, reducing infra-marginal
rents and making the marginal value A of an import license positive. If ~ were
reduced to yD (or below yD), then X would increase to equal y - rD - f.
$
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Fig. 2: Firm-level Outputs and Inframarginal Rents
Turning to the stage 2 decision to apply for an import license, the
overall profit of a license holder and non-license holder respectively can be
expressd as
~F = VtiF) + k(s,Q);(s,Q) - u and # = V(fl - u. (4.11)
Thus, from (4. 11) the gain G - # - # from a successful license application
is given by
G = G(s,Q) = V@~ - V(fl + ~(s,Q);(s,Q) (4.12)
where pF = P + X(S,Q). Since A > 0 for pF = f and V@~ - V(f) > 0 for
pF < P, it follows from (4.12) that G > 0. Taking into account that G is
earned with probability s, each final-good producer will apply for a license if
and only if its expected profit, denoted E{m}, equals or exceeds its known profit
from just buying domestic equipment: i.e. if and only if16
E{T} = SG + TD = +. (4.13)
Since the gain G is always positive, all fial-good producers make applications
for import licenses.
In stage 1, firms competing to enter the industry bid up the price of the
spwific factor to the point that E{T} = O, which from (4.11) and (4.13) impli=
a = V(fl + sG. (4. 14)
Hence the spwific factor earns rents UT = nV(P) + nsG where ‘P = n. Firms
that subsequently obtain an import license earn positive profits, but non-license
holders do not fully recover their sunk investment in the specific factor: i.e.
using (4.11), (4.12) and (4.13),
# = (1-s)G > Ofors < land~D = -sG < Ofors >0. (4.15)
5. Irnuort Licensing Schemes and AQQreQate Dommtic OutDut
As previously mentioned, a critical distinction is between “dual-price”
licensing schemes and licensing schemes in which there is a “unified market” for
the input (marginal costs are equaliti). Under a dual-price scheme, the value
X of an additional license to a license holder is below the value y = f - f to
a non-license holder and there are some non-license holders (i.e. s < 1). Since
A < rD - rF is equivalent to PF < P, license holders then face a lower marginal
opportunity cost for own use of the input and hence produce a higher output than
non-license holders. Givens > S, it follows from (4.7), that dual-price licensing
schemes are represented by the region
s E ~, min[s,l])
where ~(s, Q) = y~~ > y(fl. Since X = rD - F for s E [3,1] and there are
no non-license holders at s = 1, markek are unified in the remaining region s
E [min~,l],l].
Now considetig total production levels, let A(+) - ny(d) (A for
aggregate) represent aggregate final-good output when all producers face a price17
+ for use of the input. Thus A(f) represents the aggregate quantity of both the
final and intermediate goods that the domestic country would produce at a
prohibitive quota Q = Oand A(fl, the aggregate quantity of domestic final-good
output and intermediate imports at free trade. Using Y(s,Q) = Q/ns in (4.6) and
(4. 3) r~ectively, we obtain
s = Q/A(fl and 3 = Q/A(P). (5. 1)
Since a bindtig quota impli~ Q < A(r~, it follows thats <1. If Q < A(f),
i.e. if intermediate imports are restricted at or below the level that would be
produced domestically at Q = O, then 6 < 1 and for s G [S,1], license holders
purchase the domestically produced input at the margin unifying the markets
with A = # - rF. However, it is also possible that A(p) < Q < A(r~ making
6 > 1. In this case, A(1,Q) is strictly below # - ~, so such a quota is not
sufficiently rwtrictive to induce domestic production of the input when all firms
rweive import licenses at s = 1.
Under a dual-price scheme, ody non-license holders buy the
domestically produced input. Since non-license holders constitute 1-s of firms,
denoting the total domestic production of the input by XD, this implies XD(S) =
(1-s)A(f). Now suppose the market is unified. Ifs G ~, 1] which implies Q <
A(f), then since pF = f’, shifting more firms into the license holder category
by increasing s above 3 has no effect on production. Thus XD remains constant
at XD(S) = (1-6)A(f). If A(fl c Q < A(rF) and s = 1, no equipment is
producd domestically. In summary:
(1 - s)A(r 7 for s f ~)min[~, 1]]
X ‘(S) = { (1 - ~)A(r 9 for s t ~,1]
(5.2)
o fors=land~>l.
As for total final-good production, denotd by Y = Y(s, Q), this is just the sum
.
of XD(S) and the quantity of output Q produced using the imported input: i.e.18
Y = Y(s,Q) = x“(s) + Q (5.3)
Since from (5.2) and (5. 3), dXD/ds = dY/ds = -A(fl < 0 for s E
b, fiE,lll, an increaseins aboves causes the outputa of both products to fall
untils reachm min[~, 1], the point at which the market becomes unified. For S
< 1, further incr= ins above &have no effwt on output. Fig. 3 illustrates
thw rwulta for the case S < 1 (i.e. for Q < A(r”)). Final-good output is
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Fig. 3: Variation in Aggregate Output withs
If quota licenses were made marketable, this would cause the marginal
cosk facing final-good producers to be equalid at PF = r“ for Q < A(r”) and
at pF = ~ + A(l, Q) < r“ for A(fl < Q < A(fl, just as under the
bureaucratic scheme with market unification17.Thus total domestic output
would be the same as achieved from market unification under the bureaucratic
scheme. Proposition 1 follows.
‘me price of a license is A = rD - F for Q < A(r~ and A = X(l,Q) for
A(r”) < Q < A(fl.19
Pro~osition 1: For a given import quota Q on an intermediate product,
(i) a bureaucratic licensing scheme raises the domestic outputs of both the final
and intermediate produas relative to the use of marhtable quota licenses l~and
only 1~a dual-price marht is created in which A < y = P-f and there are
some non-license holders.
(ii) the domestic outputs of both the jinal and intermediate produ~s are
maimized by a zero-rent liceming scheme and minimized by the use of
marketable licenses.
-f follows from the text. ***
The idea driving Proposition l(i) was previously explained in Section
2. Recalling that ~ > y(r~) creates a dual-price market, making quota licenses
marketable would cause each license holder to sell some of its quota to non-
licensed holders reducing its own output so as to equalize production incentivw
across firms. For Q < A(f), the input is produced domestically so outputs are
equaliti at y(fl. Since previous non-license holders now buy less of the
domestic input, it follows that the domestic output of both the intermediate and
final goods must fall. For A(fl < Q < A(r~, previous non-license holders
switch entirely to using imports and output is equalid at y = y@~ where pF
= # + A(l,Q). Since the quota Q remains constant and the input is produced
domestically under a dual-price licensing scheme, but not when licenses are
marketable, it again follows that marketability reduces the output of both goods.
As for part (ii) of the Proposition, since the proportion of firms rweiving import
licenses is at the minimum necessary to exhaust the total import quota Q, a zero-
rent licensing scheme maximizes the proportion of non-license holders and hence
the aggregate domestic output of the input. Also, since Q is unaffected by the
licensing scheme, domestic production of the final good is also at a maximum.
At a deeper level, a dual-price licensing scheme raises domestic output20
by increasing the overall intensity of use of the specific factor. When the firm-
level quota allocation exceeds the quantity of the input the firm would use at the
domestic price I-O, this induces the firm to hire more labor so as to use the
spwific factor more intensively than it would as a non-license holder. At the
extreme, under a zero-rent licensing scheme, firms winning the quota lottery are
allocated a quota that enables them to operate at the same labor to specific factor
ratio as at free trade. In effect, non-marketability makes the quota allocation
lumpy, which raises output by forcing license holders to increase their intensity
of use of the specific factor so as to use all of the quota allocation. By contrast,
if initial quota allocations can be split up and sold, trading in quota licenses
would equali~ the intensity of use of the spwific factor across all final
producers, but at a lower output level. If Q < A(rO), all final producers would
operate at the low factor intensity associated with the domestic price f’ for
capital quipment, the same factor intensity used by non-license holders under
a dual-price bureaucratic scheme. If A(fl < Q < A(p), then since only Q
units of the final good are produced when quota licenses are marketable and Q
units are produced by licenses holders alone under a dual-price scheme, the
specific factor is again used less intensively under the marketable license
scheme.
Consideration of the effect of varying the size of the quota Q provides
some further insight into the output implications of the use of non-transferable
license-s. These effects are illustrate in Fig. 4 for a zero-rent licensing scheme
withs = s (shown as solid lines) and a marketable license scheme with s = 1
(shown as dashed lhes). Starting at fra trade (point F), the domestic country
uses the imports A(fl of the intermediate input to produce A(fl of the final
product. With marketable licenses, a small reduction in the quota below frw
trade results in an equal dwrease in final-good output (see the line Y(l ,Q)),21
whereas (as shown by the line Y@,Q)), output falls by less if s = S. As
previously explained, since non-license holders have no choim but to buy the
domestic input, even a mildly restrictive quota (in the region A(fl < Q <
A(fl) creates a domestic industry producing capital equipment whens = S, but
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Fig. 4: Aggregate Output and Quota Size.
A quota set at Q = A(fl in Fig. 4 marks the point at which domestic
production of the intermediate good commences under a marketable license
scheme. Any further reduction in the quota is matched by an equal increase in
domestic production of the input, with the result that final-good output remains
constant at A(rO), the output corrtiponding to a prohibitive quota. Essentially,
once the input is produced domestically under a unitid scheme, the size of the
quota has no effect on final-good output since all producers use the domestically
produced input at the margin. By contrast, ifs = S, firms shifted into the non-
licence holder category by a reduction in Q produce 1=s than they did as licence
holders, causing aggregate output of the final good to continue to fall. Although
more of the input is produced dom~tically, the increase is less than the
reduction in the quota. Finally, at a prohibitive quota, Q = O, the licensing22
scheme becomw irrelevant and the domestic outputs of both the intermediate and
final products are equaliti at A(fl.
6. Welfare Comparison
In developing the welfare effects, three different settings are
considered. The first is the case already considered in which the prices P and
F are constant. With rF unaffected by the quota, all quota rents go to the
domestic country. In the swond setting, foreign suppliers are assumed to raise
#in r~ponse to the quota so as to collwt all quota rents. Finally, consideration
is given to the possibility that the domestic intermediate-good industry
experienc~ decreasing costs causing P to fall as output expands.
Domestic welfare is made up of the utility U(Y’) from consumption Y’
of the final good plus consumption Z of the numeraire commodity. Since both
the price of the final good and the wage are constants, consumption Y’ and labor
income wL, where L represents the total labor used in the production of the
three goods, are not affwted by the licensing scheme. Thus setting total
domestic income, given by WL + nE{m} + UT equal to expenditure, p~ + Z=,
welfare can be expressed as
w=u(Y=) +z”=a+nE{7r}+uP, (6.1)
where u - U(Y) - pY’ + WL is constant. From E{T} = O, ~ = n and (4. 14),
it then follows that
W = W(S,Q) = a + up = a + nV(P) + nsG(s,Q), (6.2)
where, from (4. 12), G(s, Q) = V@~ - V(fl + A(s,Q)~. Since standard surplus
analysis is used, quota rents count equally towards domestic welfare regardless
of recipient. Thus welfare comparisons are unaffected if the government collects
the quota rents as would be the case if the government auctions off the
marketable licens= or if it uses a tariff that is equally restrictive as the quota.
Proposition 2 compara domestic welfare under a marketable license23
scheme with welfare under dual-price bureaucratic schemes.
Proposition 2: Suppose P and r’ are constant. For a given quota Q, domestic
welfare is mmimized by we of a marketable licewe scheme. If the propotiion
of licen.res issued is reduced under a bureaucratic scheme so as to create a dual-
price marht, this lowers the marginal quota rent A, reducing welfare. We~are
reaches its minimum under a zero-rent licensing scheme.
*E From (4.12), (3.2) and V’@~ = -~ (see (4.10)), we obtain dG/ds = -
X~/s. Hence from (6.2),
dW(s,Q)/ds = n[G + sdG/ds] = n[V@F) - V(f’)]. (6.3)
Since p’ c rD, (6.3) implies dW/ds > 0 for s E h, min~, l]). If S < 1 then,
F = p (fj. 3) implies dw/d5 = O for s G ~, 1]. Hence welfare is at a since p ,
maximum ats = min[~, 1], corresponding to welfare under a marketable license
scheme, and decreases ins until it reaches its minimum at S. Since, from (4.9),
~ >0 for s E ~, min~, 1]] and A is constant fors G [S,1], the result follows.
4*+
As Proposition 2 shows, the creation of a dual-price market through the
use of non-transferable licensw always reduces welfare if rDand P are constant.
In this second best context caused by the quota, the beneficial output effects
arising from dual-prices are gained by generating a second distortion in which
the marginal evaluation of a license by license holders is reduced below that of
non-license holders. This causes a loss of quota rents, which, with rF constant,
is suffered by the domestic country in the form of a lower return u to the
specific factor. The increased output arising from dual-prica tends to raise the
return u, but domestic welfare falls because the loss of quota rents dominates.
In effwt, the loss in quota rents is (inefficiently) translated into higher domestic
output, causing domestic welfare to fall.
But what if the dom=tic country would not enjoy the quota rents?24
Consider a setting in which a foreign monopoly supplies the input. If the
monopolist can price discriminate betwan countries, profit maximization would
lwd it to extract all the quota rent by raising its export price, denoted IF, to
wual pF = # + X. Thus, as first shown by Shibata (1968) and explored by
Krishna (1990), a government that attempted to auction import licenses with
prices determined endogenously would fmd that the price of a license is zero and
the auction raises no revenue. Setting A = O in (4. 12) and (6.2), it follows that
without quota rents, domestic welfare, denoted ~(s,Q), is given by
~(s,Q) = cr + nV(~) + nsG (6.4)
for G = V(fl - V(f) and ~ = pF, where ~ < rD and s < 1 under a dual-
price scheme.
If markets are unified and quota rents are captured by foreign firms, the
outcome is the same as an equally restrictive VER (voluntary export restraint).
Thus a VER is the natural base for comparison with dual-price licensing
schemes in which quota rents are captured by foreign firms. If the input is
produced domestically under a VER (i.e. if Q < A(rD)) then pp = # for s 6
~, 1] implies G = O and from (6.4), domestic welfare under a VER is the same
as if the quota were prohibitive: i.e.
~(s,Q) = a + nV(~) for s G ~,1]. (6.5)
Imports of the input fall as Q is reduced from Q = A(fl to Q = O, but welfare
as in (6.5) is unaffected since it is just as efficient to use domestic equipment.
For a less restrictive quota, A(f) < Q c A(fi, markets are unified ody at s
= 1 and from (6.2) and (6.4), welfare under the VER is given by
~(1,~ = a + nV(fl where ~ = ~ + A(l,Q) < rD. (6.6)
Now comparing a VER with dual-price licensing schemes, the fact that
any loss of quota rents is a loss to foreigners, significantly changes the welfare
ranking from the domestic viewpoint.25
Proposition 3: ~foreign suppliers capture all quota rents, use of any dual-price
licewing scheme increases domestic we~are relative to a WR,
~EFor Q< A(fl, since rW=pF <rDmakes G> Ofors G
~, S), the result follows comparing (6.4) with (6.5). For A(f) < Q < A(r~,
rearranging (6.4), we obtain ~(s, Q) = cr + nsV(fl +
n(l-s)V(fl for # = # + X(S,Q). Since X(S,Q) < X(l ,Q) and
(1-s)V(f) >0 fors <1, the result follows comparing ~(s,Q) fors <1 with
W(l,Q) as iD (6.6). ***
If quota rents go to foreigners, Proposition 3 has shown that the
favorable output effects from the use of a dual-price licensing scheme are
sufficient to raise domestic welfare above the level achievable with a VER.
However, if favorable output effects are causing the result, the question arises
m to why it is not necasarily optimal to maximize the domestic output of both
the intermediate and final products through the use of a mro-rent licensing
scheme (with s = ~.
Further examination of this issue reveals that the optimal licensing
scheme is influenced by variations in the rate of increase of marginal cost. As
Proposition 4 shows, for the zero-rent scheme to dominate both other licensing
schemes and a VER, it is sufficient that the third derivative C” ‘(y) of the cost
of labor function be positive or zero. Since C“ (y) > 0 because of diminishing
marginal productivity, having C” ‘(y) > 0 magnifies the rate of increase in
marginal labor costs as output increases. This favors a reduction in the
proportion s of license holders (moving s towards ~ bwause firms that are
shifted from the license holder to the non-license holder category produce less
output. Proposition 4 is neverthel~s fairly general, since the condition C” ‘(y)26
> 0 holds for a wide class of production functions’s,
Proposition 4: Suppose foreign suppliers capture all quota rents and C” ‘fi) >
0. For a given quota Q, domestic we~are is maimized by the use of a zero-rent
licensing scheme. Welfare falls in the dual-price region as the proportion of
licenses issued is increaed reaching a minimum when the market becomes
unl~ed, the outcome corresponding to a ~R.
P~fi Since dG/ds = -~(dP/ds) it follows from (6.4) that for
s G ~, min[s,l]),
dW/ds = n[V(fl - V(r”) - s~(dF/ds)], (6.7)
and dW/ds = O otherwise. Since V’@~ = - y@F) from (4.10) and (4.5a), this
implies V“ti~ = -y’@~ >0 and hence that V(fl - V(r”) < V’(fl[# - r“l
= ~[f’ - r~. Similarly, using ~ = p - C’(i) it follows from C“ ‘(y) 20 that
r“ - # = C’@) -C’(y”) < C“(y)[y - y“l. Hence
——
——
V(fl - v(f) < jc’’(y)[y - yq. (6.8)
Now combining (6. 8) with (6.7) and using d7/ds = ~ = C“(~)~/s from (4.9),
we obtain
d~/ds < -n~C’’~)yD <0 for s G ~, min~,l]]. (6.9)
Hence welfare is at its maximum at s and decreases with s until it reaches its
minimum at s = min[~, 1], the point corresponding to a VER at which the
market becomes unified. ***
The next task is to consider the possibility that the increased output
induced by the quota actually causes the domestic intermediate-good industry to
become more efficient leading to a reduction in the price rD. These gains arising,
for example, from positive externalities associated with greater experience in
‘gSince y = f(L, 1), marginal labor cost is C’(y) = w/f~. Hence C“(y) = -
wfU/(f~3 > 0 and C’“(y) = w[3(f~2 - f~f~~/(f~s. Thus C” ‘(y) > 0 if fu
<0 or if fw < 3(f~2/fU27
production are assumed to apply only to the domestic industry, the more
efficient foreign industry having already achieved them. Decreasing costs could
also arise if domestic producers experience ~onomies of scale in an imperfectly
competitive setting. Writing f = h(X~ where h’(X~ < 0 to capture this cost
reduction and using XD = XD(S) from (5.2), this defines f = h(XD(s)) = P(s)
where
df/ds = -h’(X7A(fl/[1 - (1-s)h’(X~A’(fl] >0 (6.10)
in the dual-price region s G ~,min~, l]). Since increases ins above 3 have no
effect on output, + = P(s) is constant for s E [6,1].
If the quota is below A(f), Proposition 5 shows the strong result that
any reduction in rD, however small, shifi the optimal licensing scheme into the
dual-price region. Since it is assumed that the domestic country would get the
quota rents, this provides a case in which bureaucratic allocation of non-
transferable licens~ actually dominates the use of marketable quota licensw or
an equivalent tariff.
Proposition 5: Suppose the domestic count~ captures the quota rents (F is
constant) and Q 4 A(P). If P declines with industry output, then domestic
welfare is increased (relative to using marketable licenses) by reducing the
proportion of licenses issued to the point that a dual-price domestic market is
crealed. We~are is at a muimum under some dual-price bureaucratic scheme.
kfi From (4.12), using (3.2) and dV(~(s))/ds = -yD(dP/ds) from (4.10) and
(4.2), we obtain dG/ds = -A~/s + yD(dP/ds). Hence from (6.2) using ny(fl =
A(P(s)),
dW(s,Q)/ds = n[V@~ - V(P(S))] - (1-s)A(F(s))dP/ds. (6.11)
For Q < A(fl, setting pF = #(3) in (6. 11) implies dW@, Q)/ds =
-(1-6)A(~(S))dP/ds. Hence from (6.10), dW@,Q)/ds < 0 for s E b,sl and
dW/ds = O for s E ~, 1]. Since marketable licenses correspond to s = [3,1],28
and welfare is increased by rducing s below i, the Proposition follows. ***
It should be remembered that the above results concern a welfare
comparison of the different ways of implementing a given quota, not a
justification for the imposition of the quota itself. If there were no cost reduction
from expansion of the intermediate good industry, as in the first two settings
considered, the quota clearly reduces domestic we] fare and if the dom~tic
country does not get quota rents, the negative effect of the quota is even greater.
Although a temporary quota could be justified on the basis of the infant industry
argument for protection when there is a cost reducing externality, the learning
by doing or other process that underlays the externality n~s to lwd to a
permanent reduction in costs sufficient to bring domestic costs down to world
levels so the industry can eventually compete.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that when an import quota is imposed on an
intermediate input, such as capital equipment, then the use of non-transferable
quota licenses can increase domestic output of both the intermediate and fial
products above the levels achievable with either marketable licensa or an
equally restrictive tariff. For this to occur, the bureaucratic rules must act to
create a dual-price market in which license holders face a lower marginal
opportunity cost for own use of the input than do non-license holders. This
might help explain some of the typical rules associated with import licensing
schemes in developing countries including the allocation of licenses to a limited
subset of final producers and the prohibition of resale, applying both to the
licenses and to the imported good. Since the import licensing restrictions can be
enforced by selectively allocating foreign exchange to particular firms, the paper
could also help explain the widespread use of exchange controls by developing
muntries.29
The fundamental idea driving the results is quite robust. The effect of
dual prices in raising the domestic outputs of both goods does not depend on the
nature of demand and, although pure competition is assumed so as to illustrate
the output effects in their simpl=t form, similar effects would apply under
imperfectly competition in intermediate good supply, such as Coumot or
Bertrand competition. At least in thwry, the fundamental idea should also extend
to quota licenses limiting imports of a final product. In this case, if dual prices
could be maintained behveen different groups of final-good consumers ‘9, this
would increase total domestic production and consumption of the final-good.
Moraver, as shown in the Appendix, dual-price licensing schem~ can be
designed to handle the differing import needs of domestic firms of different
sizes. This involves the allocation of firm-level quotas in proportion to the
existing size of the firm as measured by the firm’s investment in the spwific
factor. It does not matter for the results whether the firms invest in the spwific
factor, anticipating the imposition of the quota, or whether the size distribution
of firms is historically given based on past investments. The allocation rule
arising from a zero-rent licensing scheme is particularly simple: import quotas
should equal the quantity each firm would import at free trade.
Considering the broader implications of applying import restrictions to
an intermediate input deemed important for development, the economic
development literature linking the level of investments in capital by downstream
industries to monomic growth would suggest that any policy that redums
investment in capital equipment, including import restrictions, can only worsen
‘Wowever, it is likely to be substantially more difficult to monitor numerous
final-good consumers to prevent resale (and the break down of the dual-price
market) than it is to monitor final-good producers.30
growth performance. This is particularly the case if by forgoing imports, the
developing country fails to take advantage of new technology and new ideas
being developed abroad. However, Romer (1992) argues persuasively that ideas
are central to economic development, but that there are two rather different
strategies. The first involves a policy of openness to trade and foreign direct
investment so as to obtain the latest goods and technology developed abroad as
quickly as possible. The second involves judicious restrictions on trade and
investment (Taiwan is the example) so as to encourage the development of local
human capital in manufacturing and the eventual production of new technology
incorporating locally produced ideas. With respect to this latter strategy, it is
possible that the extra experience in manufacturing gained from a dual-price
scheme could favor use of such a scheme, but the long run practical difficulties
involved in implementing and maintaining such a scheme suggest that extreme
caution is warranted.
Maintenance of a dual-price licensing scheme requires not only that the
authorities be successful in preventing resale of the licenses and the imports
themselves, but also that license holders not be able to access the rwourcw of
non-license holders through long run changes in the structure of the industry,
such as merger. As modelled, this latter problem is reflected in the need to
prevent reallocation of the specific factor from non-license holders to license
holders. If over time the specific factor were to depreciate substantially or if
licence holders were able to merge with non-license holders, combining their
supplies of the specific factor, this would cause the eventual collapse of dual
prices. A new lottery for licenses would then be required to again create dual-
‘See for example, Rodrik (1994) and Lee (1994) for development of this
argument.31
prices and the associated higher output. However, given the political difficulties
likely involved in taking licenses away from established firms, the final outcome
could easily be a break down in the dual-price market, yet the maintenance of
an expensive bureaucracy which encourages rent-swking and stifles genuine new
initiatives.
In summa~, it is important to emphasis that this paper does not
advocate the use of bureaucratic import licensing rul=. Rather the idea is to help
explain why such practices may have come into effect, particularly in an
environment, as was the case 20 years ago, in which import substituting
investment in capital equipment was viewed as a main road to economic
development in manufacturing.
AuRendix A: Firms of Different Sizes
This Appendix develops a more general model in which firms can vary
in size because of different levels of investment Tj for j ~ [1. .n] in the specific
factor. The production function becomes
Y = min[X,f(L,T)], (Al)
where f(L,TJ) is assumed to be linearly homogeneous. Since most features of the
model are unchanged from the “main model” in the text, I will mostly just
highlight the new features.
Letting nQ denote the number of license holders, each final-good firm
faces an equal probability s = nQ/n of receiving an import license as before.
However, the firm-specific quota, denoted ~ is set proportionate to firm j’s
investment T in the specific factor. Noting that Q now represents the planned32
or expected level of imports of X and that 6 = Q/s~ is a constant, we have
~ = j(s,Q,Tj) = 6Tj for ~ = Q/sT, (M)
where, as in the main model, ~,(s,Q,Tj) = -~/s < 0.
The actual quantity of imports denoted by Q’ = ~~ ~ = 6 ~~ Tj
will vary depending on the actual sizes of the firms picked in the lottery.
However, if Tj = ~/n is constant across firms, then (A2) impliw ~ = Q/sn
where Q = Q’, as in the “main model” and the quota Q can be implemented
exactly. Also Q = Q* if all firms get import licenses (i.e. if s = 1). In the
general case, planned Q = E{Q*} = nQ8E{Tj} = sT6 where E{Tj} = ~/n
represents the average quantity of the specific factor per firm. Thus the
difference between Q = E{ Q’} and Q’ tends to zero as the number of fmal-
good producers increases. Consequently, although licensing schemes are
compared ex ante based on the expected level of Q, an ex-post comparison
based on the actual level of Q would typically be very little different.
The nature of the lottery together with the values of s and 6 are
announced by the government prior to the three stages of decision by final-good
producers, constituting a sub-game perfect equilibrium. In stage 1, knowing s
and 6, each potential final-good producer decides on its level of investment in
the specific factor, which becomw sunk at this stage. Any Tj > 0 giva a firm
the right to apply for an import license in stage 2 and stages 2 and 3 are as
before.
Using a superscript j to index variables that depend on ~, linear
homogeneity allows the production function yij = f(Ej,Tj) to be expressed in the
form yij = f(fi, l)Tj where (i - Lij/Tj denotes the labor to specific factor ratio.
Hence, supposing that firms purchase quipment from only one source, the
profit of firm j using equipment from source i for i = F,D can be written as
~ij = [(p-i) f(fi, 1) - Wfi - u]T, (A3)33
where f~f < 0 (from linear homogeneity) implies Tij is strictly concave in Pi. At
the stage 3 competitive equilibrium, maximizing xjD taking the prices p and P
as given, a non-license holder would increase its labor input to the point that fD
satisfies the first order condition
afi/ae” = [(p - r~f,(&’D,l) - w]Tj = o, (A4)
which defines lD as a function fD = 1(fl in equilibrium. It is important to
notice that lD is independent of T. Firm j‘s equilibrium level of output is then
given by
Y“ = Y(P,Tj) = f(l(fl, 1)~. (A5)
Next, deftig S to satisfy ~@,Q,Tj) = y(P,Tj), it follows, using (A2)
and (A5), that &is independent of T. Since ~, < 0, it also follows (as in the
main model) that each license holder j uses only the imported input if s <
min[~, 1], but purchases dom=tic equipment at the margin so as to produce the
same output yF = y(~,Tj) as it would as a non-license holder ifs E (3,1).
For s < min~, 1], each license holder j sets IF to maximize the
hgrangim %j - TFj + A(~(s,Q,Tj) - yFj) where the hgrange multiplier, A,
represents the marginal quota rent. Letting pF - rF + A and using (A3) and yFj
= Tjf(tF, 1), IF satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
dY/dfF = [(p - p~f, - w]~ = O; (A6a)
dY/dX = ~(s,Q,Tj) - yFj = [6 - f(tF,l)]Tj = O (A6b)
where (d~/dA)X = O. As can be seen from (A6a&b), lF can be written w fF
= 1~~ where h and hence PF ~ rF + x is independent of ~. Hence, ~alogous
to (A5), each license holder j produces output
y’j = y~F,Tj) - f(lb’), l)Tj, (A7)
where f ‘~F) = (ff)z/wfff < 0. Now letting s satisfy j(s, Q,Tj) = y(P,Tj), it
follows from (A2) and (A7) thats is independent of Tj. Assuming that firm-level
quotas are binding, just as in the main model s E ~,min~, 1]) represents the34
dual-price region in which h < rD - ~ and y@F) = ~(s,Q) > y(~) and S =
[min[5, 1], 1] represents the region of market unification.
To extend the central output result (Proposition 1) to this more general
model, let A(?) - ~=1 y(r’,Tj) represent aggregate domestic output when all
fial-good firms pay F for the input (as before). Since A(ri) = f(t(?), 1)~ from
(A5) and (A7), A(F) is independent of the distribution of the specific factor T
across firms. Hence, following the same reasoning as in the text, the total
(expected”) domestic production X“ of the intermediate good is given by X“
= X“(s) as in (5.2). Since, the total (expwted) domestic output of the final-good
is given by Y(s, Q) = X“(s) + Q as before and dXD/ds = -A(f) < 0 for s G
E, fi[S, 1]), Proposition 1 follows.
Examination of the stage 2 decision to apply for an import license
rquires expressions for profit. Letting p“ = rD, the stage 3 variable profit
earned by firm j evaluated at pi is given by
v@’,T) = [(p-pi) f(f@’), 1) - wf@i)]T. (AS)
Since s > S, using (A3), (A8) and PF = F + A, firm j earns profit
~j = V@F,Tj) + A7 - uTj for ~ = dTj and
P = V(r”,T) - aTj. (A9)
Hence since X >0 if pF = P and VtiF;T) - V(r”;Tj) >0 ifpF < r“, the gain,
denoted by@ - mfi - w~ from a successful license application is always strictly
positive: i.e.
d = fij - + = V@F;~) - V(+;Tj) + X6T > 0. (A1O)
Since firm j gains @ > 0 with probability s > 0, its expected profit, denoted
E{rj}, from making a license application always exceeds its known profit mm
2LIfvariation in Tj makes Q* # Q, actual output XDA = ~~a y(+,Tj) can
differ from X“ = E{XDA}.35
from just buying domestic equipment: i.e.
E{~j} = sGj + N > N. (All)
Hence, having sunk Tj in stage 1, all final-good firms choose to apply for import
licenses in stage 2.
Turning to the stage 1 choice of Tj, we first define M’ = - (dL i/dTj) 1,,
> 0 to represent the MRS (marginal rate of substitution) between labor and the
specific factor for firm j at output yfi for i = D,F. It then follows from linear
homogeneity of the production function that
M’ = (dyij/~Tj)/(dyij/~~j) = [f(~@i), 1) - t@i)fl]/f,. (A12)
Hence, using (AS), (A12) and p - pi = w/f,(t@i), 1) from (A4) and (A6a),
variable profit becomes
V@i,T) = (w/f~[f(&’Qi),l) - l@i)fl]Tj = wMiTj > 0, (A13)
and, from (Al 1), using (A9), (A1O) and (A13), firm j‘s expwted profit can be
expressed as
E(mj} = S@ + (wM(fl - u)Tj (A14)
where Gj = [W(MF - MD) + X8]Tj > 0.
In stage 1, maximizing E{rj} taking s, ~ and the price u as given, Tj
satisfiw
dE{rj}/dTj = s(dGj/dTj) + WMD - u = O, (A15)
where, from (A14), dGj/dTj = @/Tj = W(MF - MD) + X6 > 0 is independent
of Tj. Hence it follows that d2E{r}/(dTj)2 = Omaking the actual level of Tj and
the equilibrium number of firms n indeterminate. At free trade, setting PF = rF,
X = O and s = 1 in (A15) implies that MF = cr/w, which is just the familiar
result that the MRS equals the factor price ratio. However a binding import
quota causing 1 > 0 distorts this efficiency condition.
Using (A13) and dd/d~ = Gj/Tj in (A15), each firmj pays UT = sd
+ V(P;Tj) for the spwific factor, reducing E{mj} to ~ro (- (A14)) and36
generating rents for the specific factor equal to UT = ~-, [s@ + v(r”;Tj)].
The equilibrium profits of firm j are as in (4. 15): i.e. from (A9) and (A1O), ~j
= (l-s)@ >0 for s < 1 and Tq = -s@ <0 for s >0. Thus it is not hard
to S= that adjusting for the indexing of variables by ~, all the subsequent
welfare results also hold for this expanded model.
2. Importance of the Sunk Nature of the Specific Factor
To see the role played by the assumption that T is sunk prior to license
allocation, suppose that licenses are instead allocated in stage 1 prior to the
choice of T in stage 2 and stage 3 is unchanged. Since no commitment has been
made to production, all license applicants are identical. Thus in stage 1, the
government could allocate ~ = Q/ns to a proportion s of the n applicants as in
(3. 1) of the main model.
Indexing T by i for i = D,F, and using (A13), stage 3 profits are:
# = [wMF - u]~ + X; and ~ = [wMD - u]~, (A16)
where ~ = n(sTF + (1-s)T”). Since at stage 2, firms know whether or not they
hold an import license, TF >0 and T“ >0 respmtively satis~: from (A16),
dfl/dTF = WMF - u = O and
d~/dTD = WMD - u <0 (= O ifTD > 0), (A17)
From (A17), non-license holders set T“ > 0 if and only if MD = MF, which
implies (see (A12)) that markets are unified with PF = r“. Since pF < r“ for all
s when A(fl < Q < A(fl, u is then too high for non-license holders to enter
and T“ = O. License holders, using imports alone, then produce the same output
as ifs = 1. If pF = r“ when Q < A(r”), then non-license holders enter setting
TD > 0 so as to achieve the same labor to specific factor ratio as license holders
(i.e t~q = f(r”) from (A12)), but they earn zero profit (see (A16)). In both
cases, total output is the same as if licenses were marketable. Hence trading in
the specific factor prior to the allocation of quota licenses gives rise to the same
outcome as if the licenses themselves were tradeable.37
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